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Abstract
We measure how effective Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies (PETs) are at protecting users from web-
site fingerprinting. Our measurements use both ex-
perimental and observational methods. Experimen-
tal methods allow control, precision, and use on new
PETs that currently lack a user base. Observational
methods enable scale and drawing from the browsers
currently in real-world use. By applying experimen-
tally created models of a PET’s behavior to an ob-
servational data set, our novel hybrid method offers
the best of both worlds. We find the Tor Browser
Bundle to be the most effective PET amongst the set
we tested. We find that some PETs have inconsistent
behaviors, which can do more harm than good.
1 Introduction
Online data aggregators track consumer activities on
the Internet to build behavioral profiles. Traditional
forms of tracking use stateful mechanisms, where the
tracker (e.g., Google’s DoubleClick) places an identi-
fier (e.g., an HTTP cookie) with a unique value on
the consumer’s browser or computer. When the con-
sumer visits webpages where the same tracker has a
presence, their browser automatically sends the iden-
tifier value to the tracker. This allows the tracker
to link these visits to the same consumer. Two
properties make an identifier good for tracking pur-
poses: uniqueness and predictability.1 Uniqueness re-
quires that the identifier values are sufficiently unique
among consumers, whereas predictability requires the
∗The majority of this author’s contributions were made
while at Carnegie Mellon University.
1Prior work has used the term stability instead of pre-
dictability [18, 48, 37]. We see stability as a form of predictabil-
ity where identifier values remain identical.
identifier values are predictable for a consumer across
webpage visits.
Increased awareness about stateful tracking mech-
anisms has led consumers to take precautions against
them (e.g., by blocking or clearing cookies). This
has spurred the growth of stateless tracking mecha-
nisms, also known as browser fingerprinting. A state-
less tracker extracts fingerprints from consumers as a
collection of several attributes of the browser, operat-
ing system, and hardware, typically accessed through
Javascript APIs. Fingerprints collected on websites
like panopticlick.eff.org and amiunique.org/fp
demonstrate that they are sufficiently unique and pre-
dictable for tracking purposes [18, 39]. The list of at-
tributes that can be used in fingerprints is rapidly
increasing [44, 4, 3, 24, 21, 12, 58]. Studies have
also uncovered fingerprinting code on popular web-
pages [4, 3, 21].
Anti-Fingerprinting Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies (AFPETs) aim to protect consumers against fin-
gerprinting by masking, or spoofing, the values of at-
tributes. For each attribute, they can either (1) stan-
dardize it, so that all of the AFPET’s users share
the same or one of a small set of attribute values,
thereby decreasing the uniqueness of fingerprints, or
(2) vary 2 it, so that the fingerprints of all the AF-
PET’s users vary across webpage visits, thereby de-
creasing the predictability of fingerprints.
Our goal is to find attributes that AFPETs are not
masking (with either standardization or variation)
and to quantify their effects on privacy. We develop a
method that compares the trackability (i.e., unique-
ness and predictability) of AFPET-modified finger-
prints with those of the original fingerprints. De-
pending on the goals, AFPET evaluation could de-
pend on the context in which the AFPET is used,
2Tor developers use the term randomization [51]. We see
randomization as an instance of variation.
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accounting for features of other users and non-users,
or be a more theoretical assessment of the AFPET’s
potential, untied to the vagaries of today. For exam-
ple, if the goal of evaluation is to determine which
AFPET to use today, one would want to know how
many other users of the AFPET there are since they
will form the anonymity set – the group of other users
one will blend in with. If instead the goal is to deter-
mine which AFPET to fund for further development,
the user numbers of today may matter less than the
technical or theoretical capabilities of the AFPET.
Given that no one AFPET evaluation can match all
goals, we will explore points in the space of possible
evaluations while focusing more on prospective eval-
uations.
1.1 Methods
First, we consider a more theoretical, experimen-
tal analysis that directly looks at an AFPET’s abil-
ity to mask attributes. This method runs browsers
with and without an AFPET installed to determine
which attributes the AFPET masks, either by stan-
dardizing or varying its value. For this purpose,
we develop an experimental framework, PETInspec-
tor, which has three components: the fingerprint-
ing server (FPServer), which collects fingerprints from
visitors, the client simulator (ClientSim), which sim-
ulates consumers and drives them to FPServer with
and without AFPETs, and the analysis engine (æ),
which compares fingerprints across clients to produce
a mask model characterizing AFPET behaviors. This
tool can be applied to new AFPETs that currently
lack a user base. This experimental method does not
require access to the source code of AFPETs. How-
ever, it does not tell us which attributes are the most
important to mask.
Next, we consider a highly context-dependent, ob-
servational method. Websites like panopticlick.
eff.org and amiunique.org/fp obtain large sets of
real-world fingerprints, revealing which are the most
trackable (i.e., unique and predictable). In princi-
ple, these datasets can be studied to evaluate an AF-
PET by selecting the fingerprints generated by users
of that AFPET and, for each such fingerprint, check-
ing how trackable they are compared to other fin-
gerprints in the dataset. We have implemented the
core task of measuring trackablity as a tool, FPInspec-
tor, which simulates a simple tracker and computes
statistics quantifying anonymity, such as entropy. In
practice, however, such observational datasets may
contain too few users of an AFPET, especially for
new ones, for FPInspector evaluate it. Furthermore, in
some cases, it may be difficult to determine which fin-
gerprints correspond to which AFPETs. Thus, utiliz-
ing such a dataset requires a more nuanced approach.
Then, we develop a novel hybrid method com-
bining observational and experimental data to en-
able the evaluation of AFPETs with low or no usage
within the context of the browsers used today but
without access to the AFPET source code. Our hy-
brid method combines FPInspector with PETInspector
as outlined in Figure 1. It contextualizes the mask
model produced by PETInspector by applying it to
an observational dataset of real-world fingerprints to
produce a counterfactual dataset representing what
the browsers would look like to trackers had everyone
used the AFPET. By comparing the trackabilities on
the two datasets, we can evaluate the effectiveness of
the AFPET. By parametrically leveraging data from
ongoing, large-scale measurement studies, our results
may be updated for the ever changing landscape of
browsers with little additional work.
Finally, we adjust the hybrid method to take into
account the number of users an AFPET has. This
shifts the analysis even further in the direction of ex-
amining the PET’s current abilities over its theoreti-
cal possibilities.
1.2 Results
Using PETInspector, we resolved with high confidence
whether 15 AFPETs explicitly claiming to protect
against fingerprinting mask 20 attributes of Firefox
and 18 attributes of Chrome. We also looked at
11 other popular blacklisting PETs (BLPETs), which
operate by blacklisting domains known to engage in
tracking. While they do not make a claim of pro-
tecting against fingerprinting, they should not make
matters worse by giving browsers a more unique fin-
gerprint, a property we check them for.
We found that all but the Tor Browser Bundle
masked 9 or fewer of the resolved attributes, at least
in their default configurations. In particular, we
found that Tor left a single attribute, platform, un-
masked while all others left at least 12 attributes un-
masked. PETInspector also uncovered undocumented
behaviors and inconsistencies in how some PETs
modify various attributes:
• Brave Browser spoofs the User-Agent to ap-
pear like Chrome. However, it modifies
the Accept-Language header, language and
plugins differently than baseline Chrome. To
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Figure 1: Hybrid method for AFPET evaluation
a tracker, this can make Brave users stand
out from other Chrome users. We have raised
the issue with Brave developers and have re-
ceived comments from them acknowledging the
issue [13, 14].
• Privacy Badger and Firefox’s tracking protec-
tion configuration implement Do Not Track dif-
ferently. While both send the Dnt header,
only Firefox sets the doNotTrack variable in
JavaScript’s navigator object. As a result, web-
services which only use JavaScript to detect the
Do Not Track choice will not be able to do so for
Privacy Badger users. Furthermore, this incon-
sistency may make Privacy Badger’s users stand
out, making them easier to track. We raised this
issue with Privacy Badger developers who have
since fixed the issue [15].
• HideMyFootprint randomizes the User-Agent
header, while not modifying the platform. This
leads to inconsistencies like the User-Agent con-
taining Windows NT 10.0 on a Linux x86_64
platform. Moreover it sends an additional
Pragma header, which can make users distin-
guishable.
• While the Tor Browser is able to con-
ceal the operating system by spoofing at-
tributes like the User-Agent and cpu class, the
javascript fonts revealed by different brows-
ing platforms can reveal that information.
We found 6 AFPETs which masked 4 attributes,
but they did not all mask the same set of attributes.
To break such ties, we used the hybrid method. We
FS attributes
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Figure 2: FPServer collects 49 attributes, of which 29
remain unexercised by ClientSim. Amiunique dataset
has 28 unique attributes, of which 8 aren’t collected
by FPServer and 8 are collected but remain unexer-
cised by ClientSim. The red dotted rectangle rep-
resents the intersection of attributes exercised by
ClientSim and present in the amiunique dataset and
used for our hybrid evaluation.
used a pre-existing dataset of over 25,000 real-world
fingerprints collected on the website amiunique.
org.3 Of the 18–20 attributes resolved for each AF-
PET, only 12 appear in the amiunique.org dataset.
Figure 2 provides an overview of how we selected at-
tributes for our hybrid evaluation. For these 12 at-
tributes, the hybrid method generates a set of PET-
modified fingerprints from the original fingerprints
and measures the effectiveness of the 15AFPETs with
FPInspector.
Our hybrid method finds that even with just 12
3The dataset was graciously provided to us by Pierre Laper-
drix, one of the creators of amiunique.org.
3
attributes, 13 of the 15 AFPETs do not provide much
protection over using no PET at all, decreasing the
entropy revealed from about 13 bits without any PET
to 11 bits with the AFPET. It finds the Tor Browser
Bundle (Tor BB) to be most effective, revealing under
3 bits of entropy.
Recognizing that automation has its limitations,
we manually analyzed some of the more interesting
findings. We found that some AFPETs performed
better when switched out of their default configura-
tion. While we find that some do mask attributes
labeled as inconclusive by PETInspector, we did not
find any falsely labeled as masked or as unmasked.
A source of entropy for Tor BB fingerprints is
the revealed screen resolution, which is only partly
masked. Tor BB reveals partial information about
the screen resolution of its users using a spoofing
strategy which depends on the true resolution for us-
ability reasons. We explore a space of alternate spoof-
ing strategies and find some to be just as effective
according to our metrics despite being more usable,
by utilizing more pixels on average for browsing than
Tor.
1.3 Interpretation
BLPETs do not claim to protect against fingerprint-
ing and AFPETs do not claim to protect against all
forms of fingerprint. Thus, our results should not nec-
essarily be interpreted as finding flaws in PETs. An
AFPET that masks the one and only one attribute
that it claims to mask behaves as advertised.
Nevertheless, our tool can be useful for AFPET
developers. It can test whether they masked the at-
tributes they intended to do so and help ensure that
their documentation is correct. Indeed, we found that
AFPET Trace and Tor did not mask all of the at-
tributes that their documentation claimed that they
did (Table 3).
BLPETs do not claim to protect against finger-
printing, but even they should avoid making browsers
more fingerprintable than they already are. For ex-
ample, we found that Privacy Badger made finger-
printing easier by modifying an attribute in a partic-
ular and undocumented way. Despite not making any
anti-fingerprinting claims, its developers took this re-
sult seriously and updated Privacy Badger since it
was an unintended side effect of their approach to
privacy.
For consumers and their advocates attempting to
select a PET, our results are also useful beyond the
pre-existing, and sometimes flawed, documentation.
In addition to double checking documentation, such
consumers may be less concerned with whether PETs
meet their specifications than their overall effective-
ness Our hybrid method allows us to rank the PETs
in overall terms of how well they prevent fingerprint-
ing (Table 4). This fine-grained information is not
offered by the documentation of any PET.
Our results are best understood as providing a
lower bound on how much room for improvement
remains for AFPETs. Since AFPETs might mask
attributes that we do not test, we cannot claim to
have captured all the work that went into developing
an AFPET. Our lower bound on remaining work is
sound in that when PETInspector claims that an AF-
PET leaves an attribute unmasked, it really is not
masking it, is not varying the attribute often enough
to be effective, or is not masking enough values of the
attribute to protect our test browser platforms. All
three possibilities are concerning.
Our bound is only a lower bound since, by resolv-
ing only the status of 18–20 attributes of each brows-
ing platform, we might label some attributes in need
of masking as inconclusive. More attributes can be
added to our tools, but the set of possible attributes
is open ended and finding platforms that differ in all
attributes can be difficult. In fact, we are already
aware of 30 attributes that we can measure but could
not make a high-confidence masking determination
for due to having insufficient diversity in their values
across our experimental browsing platforms. How-
ever, given the long list of issues with the attributes
we did test, we may have already found enough to
keep AFPET developers busy.
As for our quantification of the importance of at-
tributes, it is based on the AmIUnique observational
data, which is not perfectly representative. Given
better data, our tool, without modifications, can pro-
duce more accurate measurements, and any inaccu-
racy in our quantification will not affect the qualita-
tive result that an attribute is left unmasked.
1.4 Contributions
We make the following main contributions:
• We develop an experimental framework
(PETInspector) to verify how 15 AFPETs
(and 11 BLPETs) mask 18–20 different at-
tributes each. By obtaining a more complete
picture of PETs’ behaviors, we uncover some
inconsistencies and peculiarities (Section 4).
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• We develop a hybrid method for evaluating AF-
PETs from an observational dataset of real-world
fingerprints and apply it to evaluate 15 AFPETs.
We find Tor BB to be the most effective AFPET
among the ones we evaluate (Section 5).
• We adjust the hybrid method to also consider
the current number of users each AFPET has
(Section 6).
• We explore a space of alternate spoofing strate-
gies for screen resolution by Tor BB and uncover
some which have higher screen utilization than
Tor BB, but are just as effective (Section 7).
2 Prior Work
Prior work finds that various attributes are track-
able by measuring the uniqueness and predictabil-
ity of fingerprints collected from real-world browsing
platforms [67, 18, 39]. However, few studies evaluate
the effectiveness of AFPETs against fingerprinting.
Many prior studies have focused on BLPETs, which
use blacklists to block known tracking domains and
scripts. Since BLPETs try to prevent the consumer’s
browser from interacting with trackers, metrics sug-
gestive of successful interactions (e.g., third-party re-
quests sent, cookies placed, etc.) are good indica-
tors of BLPET effectiveness. Studies have evalu-
ated BLPETs by comparing these metrics between
browsers with and without the BLPET when visiting
popular websites [31, 35, 53, 41, 43, 29, 34, 21]. FP-
Guard takes a blacklisting strategy to protect against
fingerprinting: it uses heuristics to identify finger-
printing domains and blocks them [23]. Gulyás et al.
study the tradeoff between a BLPET suppressing
some trackers but also leading to the browser hav-
ing a more unique fingerprint by being a rare browser
extension [28].
Most AFPETs protect against fingerprinting by
spoofing browser, operating system and hardware
characteristics, without blocking specific domains
and scripts. For example, PETs like the Tor
Browser standardize various attribute values [51],
whereas others like PriVaricator [48], FP-Block [63],
Blink [38], and FPRandom [37] vary them. Metrics
used for evaluating BLPETs would not be able to
meaningfully evaluate these AFPETs. Some stud-
ies have evaluated attribute varying AFPETs by ob-
serving variations in fingerprints when using these
AFPETs (e.g., [48, 37]). Vastel et al. look at how
AFPETs can introduce inconsistencies between at-
tributes leading to a more unique fingerprint [65].
Our work differ from these by using a combination
of experimental and observational data to more thor-
oughly evaluate AFPETs.
3 Trackers and PETs
When a user visits a webpage, trackers can have the
user’s browser execute code that requests informa-
tion about the user’s browsing platform, including
their hardware, operating system, and the browser
itself. The leftmost column of Table 3 provides a
list of 49 attributes known to be good candidates
for fingerprinting.4 The tracker can combine mul-
tiple attributes a1, . . . , an to compute a fingerprint
id(b) = 〈a1(b), . . . , an(b)〉 of the browsing platform
b where ai(b) represents the value of attribute ai for
the platform b. A tracker can use fingerprints to iden-
tify browsing platforms visiting two websites as being
the same one. The more unique the fingerprint is for
each user, the fewer false matches the tracker will
produce in linking two different users. The more pre-
dictable (ideally, unchanging) the fingerprint is as a
user goes from website to website, the fewer matches
the tracker will miss.
To protect themselves from fingerprinting, con-
sumers can install AFPETs on their browsing plat-
form, which can decrease the uniqueness or pre-
dictability of the platform’s fingerprints. Upon in-
stalling a PET p, the consumer’s browsing platform
b is modified to p(b). As a result, the tracker now in-
teracts with p(b) and extracts the fingerprint id(p(b)).
In this study, we look at three types of PETs:
I. Attribute standardizing. These AFPETs re-
veal one (full standardization) or one of a small
set of possible values (partial standardization)
for an attribute. Full standardization makes all
AFPET users appear identical, whereas partial
standardization makes them appear to be from a
small number of groups, with respect to that at-
tribute. An AFPET may choose partial over full
standardization if spoofing the attribute value
has usability implications.
II. Attribute varying. These AFPETs vary the
value of an attribute so that the values of each
4We do not consider more sophisticated cross-device [68]
and cross-browser [12] fingerprints, which aim to link together
different browsing platforms originating from the same con-
sumer.
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user varies across browsing activities. Such vari-
ations may affect both the predictability and the
uniqueness of the revealed attribute. Laperdrix
et al. [37] show that variation AFPETs can vary
attributes in a manner that reduces their usabil-
ity impact.
III. Interaction blocking. These BLPETs block
some or all interactions between the browsing
platform and trackers. They rely on a blacklist
(e.g., EasyPrivacy) to block interactions match-
ing known tracking patterns. Trackers interact-
ing with browsing platforms with these PETs re-
ceive an error message instead of the true finger-
prints.
We are primarily interested in evaluating and com-
paring AFPETs that modify the attribute values ei-
ther by standardizing (I) or varying (II) their val-
ues. In some places, we comment on BLPETs that
block interactions with known trackers (III). We do
so even for BLPETs not claiming to be AFPETs since
they are popular, have been the subject of past eval-
uation studies, have the potential to unintentionally
make fingerprints more unique (as we find with Pri-
vacy Badger), and can be used as AFPETs. (None of
BLPETs that we test suggests using it as an AFPET.
The BLPET FPGuard did [23], but we could not find
it publicly available for testing.) However, we do not
directly compare them to the AFPETs since they do
not purport to modify any attributes explicitly, and
their quality depends upon the quality of their black-
lists, necessitating a different form of evaluation.
We leave out of scope PETs that protect
against fingerprinting by blocking scripts (e.g., No-
Script [32] and ScriptSafe [8]) since they have
considerable impact on usability [31]. We also
leave out PETs like Noiszy (noiszy.com), Inter-
net Noise (makeinternetnoise.com), and AdNau-
seum (adnauseam.io) that do not attempt to prevent
tracking but rather to make it pointless by injecting
noise into the user’s history with fake clicks and web-
site visits.
In this paper, we consider a total of 26 PETs. We
assign each PET a unique abbreviation, which we use
in some tables. When the distinction is needed, we
add either a “c” for Chrome or an “f” for Firefox to
the name or abbreviation of PETs with versions for
both browsers. We present the full list of PETs, their
abbreviations, baseline browser, and strategy in Ta-
ble 1. 23 of the 26 PETs are extensions for Chrome
Attribute Standardizing
8
1
Interaction Blocking
11
0
0
Attribute Varying
4
2
Figure 3: Strategies of the 26 PETs we evaluate
and Firefox5 (the two most popular desktop browsers
at the time of writing), two are full browsers, and one
is a browser configuration. Among browser exten-
sions, 11 are for Chrome, and 12 are for Firefox.6 12
of the 23 extensions are pairs of 6 extensions available
for both Chrome and Firefox. 15 of the 26 PETs are
AFPETs and purport to either standardize or vary at-
tribute values, while 11 others are popular BLPETs.
Some PETs assume mixed strategies. For example,
Brave, HideMyFootprint, and Trace modify some at-
tributes in addition to blocking some types of inter-
actions. The distribution of the strategies adopted
by these 26 PETs are presented in Figure 3.
We went over the documentation of the PETs to
uncover how they purport to modify attributes. For
all PETs that explicitly document masking an at-
tribute, we place a  in the corresponding cell in
Table 3. This approach is similar to how Torres et al.
produce their comparison table [63, Table 1]. How-
ever, the documentation is not always clear about
which attributes are masked. One can obtain addi-
tional clarity from the programs themselves for open-
sourced PETs, but source-code analyses cannot be
applied to proprietary PETs. As a result, the s in
Table 3 may not reflect the full picture of how PETs
mask attributes. Next, we demonstrate how we use
our experimental method to obtain a more complete
picture of the masking behavior.
5Extensions for Firefox are called add-ons.
6Several Firefox extensions have been rendered incompat-
ible with Firefox 57.0+ due to a transition in their add-on
policies.
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Table 1: List of PETs we study, their abbreviation,
and strategy to protection. Most PETs are browser
extensions, * indicates full browsers, and ** indicates
browser configurations.
PET Abbr. Strategy
AFPET
claim?
Chrome PETs
CanvasFingerprintBlock [10] cfb I X
Privacy Extension [57] pe I X
Brave [11] br* I+III X
Canvas Defender [46] cdC II X
Glove [47] gl II X
HideMyFootprint [1] hmf II+III X
Trace [2] tr II+III X
Adblock Plus [22] apC III
Disconnect [17] dC III
Ghostery [26] ghC III
Privacy Badger [20] pbC III
uBlock Origin [30] uoC III
Firefox PETs
Blend In [52] bi I X
Blender [42] bl I X
No Enum. Extensions [54] ne I X
Stop Fingerprinting [49] sf I X
Tor Browser Bundle [51] Tor* I X
TotalSpoof [25] to I X
Canvas Defender [46] cdF II X
CanvasBlocker [33] cb II X
Adblock Plus [22] apF III
Disconnect [17] dF III
Ghostery [26] ghF III
Privacy Badger [20] pbF III
Tracking Protection [60] tp** III
uBlock Origin [30] uoF III
4 Experimental Evaluation of
AFPETs
We now consider an experimental, or test-based, ap-
proach to AFPET evaluation conducted with artifi-
cial users. These artificial users browse on platforms
differing in whether they have an AFPET installed.
By comparing fingerprints generated by these artifi-
cial users, we infer which attributes the AFPET is
masking. We use the degree of masking by each AF-
PET as an evaluation metric.
Below, we discuss this method and our experimen-
tal framework, PETInspector, implementing it. We
then describe an experiment we ran using PETInspec-
tor and the results. The results show that while one
could instead look to an AFPET’s documentation for
information on which attributes it masks, the docu-
mentation sometimes provides an incomplete picture
of an AFPET’s behavior. We end with a discussion
of this method’s limitations.
4.1 Method
Our experimental framework, PETInspector, is com-
posed of three parts. The client simulator, ClientSim,
creates and drives experimental browsing platforms,
with and without various AFPETs installed, to visit
a server. The fingerprinting server, FPServer, col-
lects fingerprints when the browsing platforms, driven
by ClientSim, visit it. The analysis engine, æ, com-
pares fingerprints across clients to detect whether an
AFPET varies, standardizes, or does not mask the
value of an attribute. To observe these behaviors, æ
compares the value of the attribute on the browsing
platform without any AFPET (i.e., on the baseline
browser) with the value when an AFPET is installed.
FPServer plays the role of an online tracker with the
browsers and FPServer interacting to simulate finger-
printing in the wild. The components surrounding
this simulation produce a view of AFPETs’ effects
on fingerprints, with ClientSim telling æ which finger-
prints correspond to which AFPETs.
Client Simulator ClientSim drives simulated
clients using browsing platforms with different
configurations to visit FPServer. For each base
configuration and PET, ClientSim simulates a pair of
clients only differing on whether the PET is installed,
to allow the isolation of the PET’s effects.
We choose the base configurations to exercise a
wide range of attribute values in hopes of triggering
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an AFPET’s masking behavior even when the mask-
ing is partial. For attributes that differ across the
browsing platforms, we can detect whether an AF-
PET was standardizing them by comparing their val-
ues across the platforms. Thus, we set up ClientSim to
exercise control over as many attributes as possible.
ClientSim simulates browsing platforms either locally
on a computer or on pre-configured VirtualBox vir-
tual machines [66] to exercise control over many of
these attributes.
ClientSim sets up virtual machines and configures
them according to stated preferences, including sim-
ulating different fonts, timezones, languages, and
screen properties. ClientSim installs different fonts by
adding a TrueType font file (.ttf file) to the .fonts
folder. Both Firefox and Chrome allow fonts from
this folder to be rendered on a webpage. To set
timezones, ClientSim uses the timedatectl command
available by default on Linux. ClientSim specifies
the language using the locale-gen and by changing
the LANG environment variable. Moreover, ClientSim
installs the corresponding Firefox language pack.
Chrome does not have different installers for differ-
ent languages, instead switching language based on
the LANG environment variable. For screen attributes,
specifically Height, Width and Depth, ClientSim uses
the display server Xvfb. For native browsing plat-
forms including Mac, Linux and Windows, we used
configurations in which we found them.
Exercising control over some attributes is diffi-
cult. Some attributes require modifications to hard-
ware (e.g., max touch points) or operating system
libraries (e.g., math attributes). Screen attributes
other than Height, Width and Depth cannot be sim-
ulated using Xvfb. Moreover, we restrict ClientSim
to configuring attributes in the operating system
while leaving browser settings intact. We do this
to prevent re-configuring every browser instance af-
ter launch which may nullify the effect of the in-
stalled AFPET. As a result, ClientSim does not ex-
ercise openDB, indexedDB, two storage attributes,
and six header attributes. ClientSim does not con-
figure plugins since most plugins no longer work on
Firefox [61] or Chrome [16] and they are gradually be-
ing phased out. We do not exercise the DNT enabled
attribute since it conflicts with Tracking Protection.
Nor do we exercise the adBlock installed (a heuris-
tic Javascript test that attempts to insert an ad script
into the page) and has lied with attributes (which
checks whether the browser lied about certain at-
tributes) since they are aimed at detecting various
PET behaviors.
After setting up a simulated browsing platform,
ClientSim drives browser instances on them using
the Selenium Webdriver [55] to FPServer. ClientSim
launches a browser in its original configuration or
with a PET installed. For PETs that are browser ex-
tensions, ClientSim utilizes Selenium’s add_extension
feature on the PETs’ .crx (Chrome) or .xpi (Fire-
fox) extension files to launch a PET-enabled browser
instance. For PETs that configure browsers, ClientSim
launches browser instances with specific settings. For
PETs that are full browsers, ClientSim uses binaries
(for Brave) or specialized software (tbselenium [5, 6]
for Tor BB).
The browser instances interact with FPServer in a
specified pattern of reloads and idling to provide in-
sights about the modification behavior of PETs. In
hopes of triggering a PET’s ability to mask by varying
attribute values, ClientSim drives its browsers across
various boundaries that may cause the PET to re-
fresh its spoofed value: reloads of a single domain,
visits to different domains (we give FPServer two do-
main names), and browsing across sessions. We de-
fine a session to browsing separated by 45 minutes
of down time, following Mozilla’s definition of a ses-
sion as a continuous period of user activity in the
browser, where successive events are separated by no
more than 30 minutes [64].
Fingerprinting Server FPServer collects at-
tributes known to be helpful for fingerprinting.
Specifically, we set up FPServer to collect attributes
collected by the open-source fingerprinting programs
used by FPCentral [36] and Panopticlick [19], often
by re-using their code. We list these attributes in
the first column of Table 3. Similar to websites like
panopticlick.eff.org and amiunique.org/fp,
any browser visiting these domains can view their
fingerprint, while a copy is stored on the server.
FPServer has minor modifications in the attributes
it collects and how it collects them. For example,
FPServer detects additional Noto fonts, which ship by
default on Tor BB. Moreover, FPServer does not place
cookies on the browsers visiting our domains, which
FPCentral and Panopticlick use to identify returning
visitors.
Analysis Engine To check for masking by a PET,
æ uses both the fingerprints collected by FPServer
from the browsers driven by ClientSim and information
directly from ClientSim stating which browser used
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Figure 4: The Analysis Engine (æ) of PETInspector
which PETs and in which configurations. Figure 4
provides an overview of æ. In short, the analysis
looks for both masking by standardization and by
variation. If it detects standardization or variation
for an attribute, it models the attribute as masked
in the mask model of the PET that it produces. It
models an attributes as unmasked if it is able to thor-
oughly test it and find neither type of masking. The
possible results of the analysis are
1. Label as inconclusive: variation testing impos-
sible due the baseline browser varying the at-
tribute
2. Label as masked: AFPET-induced variation de-
tected
3. Label as masked: AFPET-induced standardiza-
tion detected
4. Label as inconclusive: partial standardization
cannot be ruled out due to not having browsing
platforms that differ enough in the attribute
5. Label as unmasked: impactful standardization
ruled out as unlikely
In more detail, æ consumes a list of experimen-
tal results from ClientSim performed on a variety of
browsing platforms. For each tested pair of an at-
tribute and a PET, æ first checks whether its value
varied for any of browser platforms without the PETs
installed as they cross the three boundaries men-
tioned above. If so, it cannot detect whether the
PET varies that attribute since it is already varying.
In this case, æ labels the attribute as inconclusive
and records the reason for this conclusion. If not, æ
goes on to check whether the attribute’s value varied
for any of the browsing platforms with the addition
of the PET and, if so, labels the attribute as masked
for this reason.
If the attribute is not labeled under either variation
check, æ checks whether the attribute was masked
by standardization. First, for each baseline browsing
platform, it checks whether the value differs between
the baseline platform and the platform with the PET
installed. If so, æ concludes that the PET standard-
ized the attribute since the only difference between
the two platforms is the addition of the PET and
variation has already been ruled out. If not, then we
can rule out full standardization with certainty but
not partial standardization.
In general, ruling out partial standardization with
experiments requires testing for all possible attribute
values, a prohibitively expensive, if not impossible,
task for many attributes. However, æ can, in reason-
able time and with reasonable confidence, rule out
impactful partial standardization, that is, standard-
ization that affects at least a fraction f of the values.
To do so, æ estimates the probability of seeing at
least one changed value given that at least a fraction
of them f are being standardized. If this probability
is below some threshold α, æ rejects the idea that
tool is impactfully standardizing and labels the at-
tribute as unmasked with confidence α. Otherwise,
the result is inconclusive since not enough values of
the attribute were tested. We use the geometric dis-
tribution to estimate likelihood of finding masking
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given that a fraction f is happening. Appendix A
provides details.
4.2 Experiment
Using PETInspector, we performed an initial experi-
ment finding no additional spoofing from AFPETs
crossing sessions. Thus, to save time, our main ex-
periment uses only a single session and does not check
for the masking of attributes by variation across ses-
sions.
We use ClientSim to simulate six browsing plat-
forms. Three of these are virtual machines running
various versions of Linux. We introduce additional
changes into these virtual machines to simulate dif-
ferences in the system configurations. Specifically,
we install different fonts and browser versions, set
up different timezones, and simulate different screen
resolutions and languages, The remaining platforms
run natively on a Linux desktop, Macbook Pro, and
a PC laptop. We perform measurements on Firefox
and Chrome browsers. More details on these config-
urations are in Table 2
ClientSim drives these experimental browsing plat-
forms to load FPServer for five reloads of each of the
two domain names of FPServer. For each platform, it
does these reloads a total of 28 times: one time each
for 26 PETs and one time each for the two baseline
browsers. All PETs are left in their default configu-
ration.
4.3 Results
Before commenting on PETs, we make some obser-
vations about the baseline browsers. While we did
not think of the choice of browsers as affecting the
trackability of fingerprints, it turns out that compar-
ing our baseline measurements for the two browsers
reveals small differences in the attributes shared by
them. Among the simulated platforms, Chrome sets
the cpu class to unknown, the screen.Depth to 24,
and the buildID to Undefined, unlike Firefox which
reveals different values across browsing platforms. On
the other hand, Firefox does not reveal any plugins,
while Chrome does. Chrome’s plugins differ across
Ubuntu, Debian, and macOS. PETInspector does not
find any baseline browser to vary any attributes itself
(outcome (1) in Fig. 4).
Turning to PETs, PETInspector automatically pro-
duces Table 3 which displays attributes masked or
not by AFPETs. We comment upon the BLPETs in
text. We provide PETInspector with the masks that
each tool’s documentation purports, which it uses to
facilitate comparing documented behaviors with ob-
served behaviors.
Among the 15 AFPETs, three (Trace, Privacy Ex-
tension, and No Enum. Extensions) do not lead to
any detectable masking in their default configura-
tions. The remaining 12 AFPETs mask at least one
of the collected attributes.
Our experiment also detects undocumented mask-
ing of attributes by AFPETs. For example, while
Canvas DefenderC, Canvas DefenderF, CanvasFin-
gerprintBlock, Glove, and CanvasBlocker claim to
spoof only the canvas fingerprint, we also find
them spoofing webGL attributes. Similarly, we find
undocumented modifications by Brave, Stop Finger-
printing, and TotalSpoof. We also find inconsis-
tencies in the behavior of Brave, Privacy BadgerC,
Privacy BadgerF, HideMyFootprint, and Tor BB,
which we discussed in Section 1.2.
Among the 11 BLPETs, four (DisconnectF,
DisconnectC, GhosteryC, and GhosteryF) do
not lead to any detectable modifications of at-
tributes, four (Adblock PlusC, Adblock PlusF,
uBlock OriginC, and uBlock OriginF) modify
the attribute adBlock installed, and three
(Privacy BadgerC, Privacy BadgerF, and Tracking
Protection) modify Do Not Track attributes. As
discussed in the introduction, these BLPETs are
presented as AFPETs, but their modifications can
actually make their users more identifiable. Indeed,
Privacy Badger was updated in response to our
finding.
Given the difficulty of taking in Table 3, for the
purpose of ranking AFPETs relative to one another,
we provide Figure 5 considering each of these masking
behaviors as equally valuable for reducing trackabil-
ity. This level of abstraction in modeling AFPETs
seems reasonable given our belief that trackers are
foiled by any of these methods given the complexity
of, for example, using a varying attribute for track-
ing. We produce a pre-ordering of the AFPETs where
one AFPET p1 is above or equal to another AFPET
p2 iff p1 masks every attribute that p2 does. Those
desiring a finer gradation can look at the number of
attributes masked, but must bear in mind that not all
attributes are equally important to mask. The hybrid
evaluation discussed in Section 5 takes into account
the relative importance of different for ranking AF-
PETs.
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Table 2: Configurations of simulated browsing platforms in our main experiment. The last three were
regularly used.
# Type OS
Addl.
Resolution
Locale
Timezone
Browser versions Notes
Fonts & LANG Firefox Chrome
1 VM Ubuntu 16.04 Mordred 450×721×24 ru_RU.UTF-8 GMT+6 56.0 63.0
2 VM Debian 8.10 OldLondon 2000×2000×16 de_DE.UTF-8 GMT-3 56.0 63.0
3 VM Ubuntu 14.04 (none added) 6000×3000×24+64 ar_SA.UTF-8 GMT-11 56.0 63.0
4 Local Ubuntu 16.04 > 40 1920×1080×24 en_EN.UTF-8 GMT-8 56.0 70.0
5 Local macOS 10.13 > 145 1440×900×24 en_EN.UTF-8 GMT-8 56.0 70.0
6 Local Windows NT 10.0 > 145 1280×720×24 en_EN.UTF-8 GMT-8 56.0 beta 69.0 Touch screen
21 Tor BB
9 Stop Fingerprinting
8 Brave
6 HideMyFootprint Blender
4 Canvas DefenderC, cfb, Glove Blend In Canvas DefenderF TotalSpoof
2 CanvasBlocker
0 Privacy Extension, Trace, ne
Figure 5: Ranking of AFPETs by the experimental method. Arrows show the pre-order, with AFPETs at
an equivalent order being grouped together. The y-axis shows the number of attributes masked.
4.4 Discussion and Limitations
As discussed in Section 1.3, the ranking above may
not be suitable for some evaluation goals. For
example, some AFPETs were designed to mask a
single attribute and does in fact mask it (e.g.,
Canvas DefenderC). Our findings that such AFPETs
(or BLPETs) do not mask all attributes should not
be interpreted as the PET having a bug. Neverthe-
less, consumers and advocates seeking effective PETs
may find our results useful.
As mentioned above, we may miss some masking
of attributes due to not testing values that a PET
standardizes away. Furthermore, we may not detect
a PET varying an attribute across a boundary that
we do not test. Thus, while we can be sure of masking
when we find it, we cannot be sure we have found all
masking.
FPServer extracts fingerprints by running first-party
fingerprinting scripts on browsing platforms. Thus,
we do not detect masking that happens for only third-
party scripts.
To an extent, these limitations can be miti-
gated with more comprehensive experiments using
PETInspector. For example, one can modify FPServer
to collect additional attributes in both first-party
and third-party contexts. Moreover, one can modify
ClientSim to detect variations across other boundaries
and use more diverse experimental browsing plat-
forms to be more confident about not missing stan-
dardization modifications. We will make PETInspector
freely available for more extensive experimentation
and further development. Our current evaluations
demonstrate the benefits of an experimental evalua-
tion method for AFPETs within the current bound-
aries.
Where our experiments dispute claimed masking
( in Table 3), it may be due to the above limi-
tations rather than documentation making spurious
claims. PETs may mask more attributes when config-
ured to do so, but users find it difficult to change the
defaults [40], suggesting our experiments may cap-
ture typical use. Next, we perform additional man-
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Table 3: AFPET masks as purported and observed by PETInspector.  indicates AFPET’s documenta-
tion purports that the attribute is masked. The remaining symbols represent the possible outputs of
PETInspector: + indicates observed masking, × indicates no masking found even when it is likely to de-
tect it, and · indicates inconclusive results. For the results that we manually double checked, we include
the outcome of that check as a superscript. Here, × denotes that the PET really does not mask the at-
tribute, + that it does, ×/+ that it is not masked by default but can be with configuration, and ? that
the manual analysis was inconclusive. Not shown are attributes that had all inconclusive results and not
purported masking (nothing but ·): DNT enabled, IE addBehavior, adBlock installed, h.Connection,
h.Dnt, h.Up.-Ins.-Req., indexedDB, math.acosh(1e300), math.asinh(1), math.atanh(05), math.cbrt(100),
math.cosh(10), math.expm1(1), math.log1p(10), math.sinh(1), math.tanh(1), and openDB.
Chrome Firefox
Attribute br cdC cfb gl hmf pe tr bi bl cdF cb ne sf Tor to
buildID · · · · · · ·   × × × ×  +
canvas fingerprint      ×/+ × × ×   × ×  ×
cookies enabled · · · · ·  · · · · · · · · ·
cpu class · · · · · · ·   × × × +  +
h.Accept · · · · ·  · · · · · · ·  ·
h.Accept-Encoding · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  ·
h.Accept-Language + × × × × × × ×  × × × ×  ×
h.Pragma · · · · + · · · · · · · · · ·
h.User-Agent  × × ×  ×/+ ×   × × × ×  
javascript fonts × × × × × × × × × × × × ?  ×
language + × × × × × × ×  × × × ×  ×
local storage · · · · ·  · · · · · · · · ·
platform × × × × × × ×   × × × × × +
plugins  × × × × × × · · · · + +  ·
screen.AvailHeight × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
screen.AvailLeft × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
screen.AvailTop × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
screen.AvailWidth × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
screen.Depth · · · · · · · × × × × ×   ×
screen.Height × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
screen.Left · · · · · · · · · · · ·   ·
screen.Pixel Ratio × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
screen.Top · · · · · · · · · · · ·   ·
screen.Width × × × × × × × × × × × ×   ×
session storage · · · · ·  · · · · · · · · ·
timezone × × × × × × × × × × × × ×  ×
touch.event · · · · · · · × × × × × ×  ×
touch.max points × × × × × × × · · · · · · · ·
touch.start · · · · · · · × × × × × × + ×
webGL.Data Hash  + + + + × × × × + + × ×  ×
webGL.Renderer  + + + + × × × × + × × ×  ×
webGL.Vendor  + + + + × × × × + × × ×  ×
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ual analysis to understand the effects of configuration
and why our results are in conflict with the documen-
tation of some PETs.
4.5 Additional Manual Analysis
To address some of the limitations mentioned above,
we perform manual analysis of some PETs. Specif-
ically, we analyze AFPETs for which we found no
evidence of any masking (Trace, Privacy Extension,
No Enum. Extensions) and those which made a claim
rejected by PETInspector (Trace, Privacy Extension,
Stop Fingerprinting, Tor).
PETInspector rejects two claims of masking by
Trace. We could not find the source code for Trace,
but we installed the extension and manually exam-
ined it. Both the documentation and settings panel
show canvas fingerprinting being masked by default,
despite our studies concluding the opposite. As far as
we can tell, Trace really does not mask this attribute
despite claiming to. Since running our tests, Trace
has been updated from version 1.0.2 to 1.8.6 and it
now randomizes the canvas fingerprinting.
As for masking the user-agent, the settings panel of
Trace shows that user-agent randomization is off by
default, explaining our finding. (It’s under the “Ad-
vanced Features” tab, despite their webpage promi-
nently advertising the feature.) Turning it on does
randomize the user agent.
All of Privacy Extension’s masking abilities are off
by default. Turning them on does result in standard-
izing the two attributes in question: the canvas fin-
gerprint and the user-agent.
To analyze No Enum. Extensions, we examined
both its source code and documentation. The doc-
umentation of No Enum. Extensions only claims to
mask plugins and we found evidence of plugin mask-
ing in No Enum. Extensions’s source code. PETInspec-
tor was inconclusive for this attribute since it was
unable to exercise the plugin list for Firefox due to
Firefox making the loading of any plugins a man-
ual process. Thus, this instance does not represent a
false negative, and instead represents a failure to find
a positive.
We manually tested Stop Fingerprinting and found
that, like No Enum. Extensions, it masks plugins de-
spite PETInspector’s inconclusive finding. As for the
rejected claim of masking javascript fonts, Stop Fin-
gerprinting may be doing something with the fonts,
but not enough to defeat the way FPServer fingerprints
them.
Examining Tor BB leads us to believe that a re-
cent update (after Version 7.0.11), accidentally af-
fected its masking of the platform attribute. We also
find that during the same time frame, the cpuclass
and h.User-Agent went from being apparently fully
masked to partially masked. We have found user
complaints about this change in behavior for ver-
sion 8.0a10 [9].
We also confirmed that Privacy Badger did not set
the doNotTrack field of the navigator object to match
the Dnt header. The code was fixed after we notified
the developers of the issue [7].
5 Hybrid Evaluation of AFPETs
Our experimental method provides a model of how
various AFPETs mask fingerprints as well a ranking
of AFPETs based on the number of attributes they
mask. However, it does not consider how important
masking each attribute is.
We develop a hybrid method that combines the
benefits of the experimental method with an obser-
vational method. We start by considering a com-
pletely observational method and then discuss how
combining it with our experimental method allows
us to overcome each of their limitations.
In short, the method uses mask model of each AF-
PET provided by the experimental method. For each
attribute, we model the AFPET as masking the at-
tribute if the mask model indicates so or if the exper-
iment was inconclusive, thereby overestimating the
AFPET’s abilities. We use this mask model to trans-
form a set of original fingerprints collected on the
amiunique website into a counterfactual AFPET-
modified set, which simulates the browsing platforms
in the original dataset visiting amiunique with an
AFPET installed. To determine the effectiveness
of the AFPET, we compare trackability in the two
datasets.
5.1 Sampling
We cannot, in practice, see all the world’s browsing
platforms and instead must work with a sample. The
quality of the metrics computed from the sample de-
pends upon both the nature of the metric and the
sample. For example, a random sample will provide
a reasonable estimation of the entropy (e.g., [50]).
However, estimating the proportion of users in small
anonymity sets from even a random sample proves
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difficult since the length of the tail of the distribu-
tion may be unclear from a random sample.
Furthermore, in practice, we must approximate
truly random samples of browser platforms from
available datasets since we cannot force all users to
participate. We do so by using a convenience sample
provided to us by the amiunique website, which col-
lects fingerprints to understand how trackable they
are. This sample comprises 25,984 real-world finger-
prints collected over a period of 30 days (10/02/2017
to 11/02/2017). Each fingerprint comprises 32 differ-
ent attributes.
Determining the representativeness of this sample
is difficult since it can only be compared to other
possibly unrepresentative samples. We compare our
sample’s distributions to GlobalStat’s for desktop
users [59]. We find that our sample has a higher pro-
portion of Firefox users (42% vs. 12%) and of Linux
users (19% vs. 1%). Perhaps people visiting browser
fingerprinting websites have more technical knowl-
edge and a preference for open-source technologies.
5.2 Metrics of Trackability
We haven’t yet defined what we mean by trackability.
Is a tracker that can determine with 10% certainty
90% of the time that you visited a website worse than
one that can determine it with 90% certainty 10% of
the time? This depends upon both the tracker’s and
the evaluator’s goals. With this in mind, we do not
argue for a single metric, but rather consider a few.
To measure trackability of the fingerprints, we have
implemented FPInspector, which consumes a dataset
and characterizes how trackable its members are.
One such characterization is the anonymity set. An
anonymity set comprises browsing platforms with
identical fingerprints that are, thus, indistinguishable
from each other. Thus, the smaller and more numer-
ous the anonymity sets, the higher the uniqueness.
FPInspector implements various proposed functions of
the distribution of anonymity sets of browsing plat-
forms for measuring uniqueness [67, 18].
The first metric which we use to measure unique-
ness is entropy. For a set of browser platforms D =
{bi}i, such as those using a particular AFPET, let
D[id(·)] denote the multiset of fingerprints {id(bi)}i
where id(·) is the fingerprinting mechanism. The en-
tropy of these fingerprints is given by
ent(D[id(·)]) = −
∑
idk∈D[id(·)]
Pr[idk] log2(Pr[idk])
where Pr[idk] is the probability of observing the fin-
gerprint idk, which we estimate from the frequency
of idk in D[id(·)]. The higher the entropy, the higher
the uniqueness of the fingerprints.
FPInspector also measures the proportion of users
in anonymity sets of size less than or equal to 1
(prop_less1) and 10 (prop_less10). These metrics
measure the proportion of browsing platforms hiding
in anonymity sets of sizes at most 1 and 10. The
higher prop_less1 is, the higher is the fraction of
browsing platforms that can be uniquely identified.
Similarly, higher prop_less10 indicates a higher frac-
tion of browsing platforms that can be identified to
a set of size at most 10. Thus, higher values of these
metrics indicate higher uniqueness of the fingerprints.
FPInspector measures effectiveness of a PET p
against fingerprinting mechanism id(·) from the
dataset of fingerprints D[id(·)] in terms of a metric
f in {ent, prop_less1, prop_less10} as
eff f(p, id,Dp,Dp¯) := f(Dp¯[id(·)])− f(Dp[id(·)]) (1)
where Dp is a subset of D using the PET and Dp¯ is
the rest of D.
5.3 Limitations of Observations Alone
In principle, a highly-context dependent, completely
observational method could function by comparing
the fingerprints produced by users of each AFPET
to determine which are the least trackable. In prac-
tice, we face difficulties with obtaining a representa-
tive sample of AFPET users and determining which
users run which AFPETs.
PET determination. Determining PET use from
fingerprints not explicitly containing the information
is difficult. This limitation can be overcome by a
fingerprinting server designed to collect information
about PET use. One approach is to ask visitors about
their PETs, but users can be unaware of their own
browser’s configurations. In some cases, PETs have a
distinctive fingerprint that gives away their use, but
this would only help us with a subset of PETs. More-
over, this approach would not work with AFPETs
which attempt to have a common fingerprint also
had by non-users of the AFPET. Alternatively, fin-
gerprint collection websites can use automated meth-
ods to detect browser extension PETs (e.g., [58, 56]).
Unfortunately, our observational data lacks this in-
formation.
PET sampling. Even with a fingerprinting server
collecting PET information, getting a representative
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sample of real users with AFPETs to visit the website
may be difficult, since there are few AFPET users.
This is especially true for new and not yet popu-
lar AFPETs. Furthermore, users of AFPETs may be
systematically different from users without AFPETs,
thereby introducing confounding factors influencing
the trackability metrics. To remove or minimize the
effect of these confounding factors, one may have to
identify matched pairs of users, one using an AFPET
and another not.
Due to these limitations, we cannot apply FPIn-
spector directly to our dataset. Moreover, the PET
sampling limitation may prevent application of this
method directly to data collected on even fingerprint-
ing servers designed for PET determination. Thus,
we instead use FPInspector in an hybrid evaluation
method that avoids the PET determination and sam-
pling problems altogether.
5.4 Overcoming the Limitations of
Observations
To overcome the difficulty of getting a sample Dp of
browser platforms using a PET p, we construct our
own from a sample Dp¯ of browser platforms not using
p. We then provide both to FPInspector, which uses
eff f (see Eq. 1 above) to evaluate the PET p, as show
in Figure 1.
This approach requires that we first get a sample of
platforms not using p. We start with the amiunique
dataset. To convert that dataset of fingerprints into
one of platforms, we need a mapping of fingerprints
to unique browsing platforms. We approximate this
mapping using cookie IDs associated with each fin-
gerprint. We treat fingerprints with different cookie
IDs as being produced by different browsing platform.
This approach is similar to Eckersley, who also uses
cookies in his Panopticlick study to approximate re-
turning visitors [18]. In the dataset, 21,395 finger-
prints have a cookie associated with them, of which,
18,295 are unique.
To obtain Dp¯[id(·)], we sanitize the dataset to re-
move fingerprints with obvious signs of PET use,
specifically those with JavaScript disabled and illegit-
imate screen resolutions. Additionally, we only retain
fingerprints from desktop browsers (with Windows,
Mac, or Linux OSes) since all the PETs we study are
for desktops. These sanitizations leave 17,109 finger-
prints. Finally, we separate this set into two sets of
fingerprints, one from Chrome and another from Fire-
fox browsers by looking at the User-Agent attribute
in each fingerprint. This results in 9,493 Chrome and
6,516 Firefox browser fingerprints, which we use to
simulate the tracker’s view of the original fingerprints
for evaluating Chrome and Firefox AFPETs respec-
tively. We find that the original fingerprints reveal
13.002 and 12.359 bits of entropy for Chrome and
Firefox browsers respectively. These and other met-
rics are presented in Table 4 corresponding to the ‘no
mask’ row.
The mask model from the experimental method
provides a way to transform these original finger-
prints. We apply the mask model pˆ of an PET p pro-
duced by PETInspector to the sample Dp¯ of platforms
without a PET to generate a sample of fingerprints
Dpˆ[id(·)]. This generated sample estimates what the
original fingerprints would had looked like had the
platforms used the PET p. We use FPInspector to cal-
culate the trackability metrics of the modified finger-
prints and unmodified fingerprints. By comparing the
metrics of the original and pˆ-modified fingerprints, we
estimate the effectiveness of the PET p.
Of the 49 original attributes, PETInspector pro-
vides a conclusive characterization for 18 attributes
on Chrome browsers and 20 attributes on Fire-
fox browsers. Of these, only 12 appear in the
amiunique.org dataset. For a given PET, we mask
these 12 attributes according to the model generated
by PETInspector and fully mask the remaining 16 at-
tributes in the amiunique.org dataset for which the
experiment is inconclusive. By fully masking incon-
clusive attributes, we overestimate the effectiveness
of PETs. Thus, we generate a set of PET-modified
fingerprints (i.e., Dpˆ[id(·)]) from the original finger-
prints and measure effectiveness of the 15 AFPETs.
5.5 Results
We present the metrics of trackability from Sec-
tion 5.2 for both Chrome and Firefox AFPETs in
Table 4. The original fingerprints reveal 13.002
and 12.359 bits of entropy for Chrome and Firefox
browsers respectively. Applying a base mask compris-
ing all inconclusive attributes reduces the entropies to
12.914 and 12.177 bits.
Our evaluations reveal that all AFPETs but Brave
and Tor BB reveal over 11 bits of entropy and hence
are marginally better than not using any AFPET at
all. For these AFPETs, fewer than 20% of the finger-
prints are in anonymity sets of size greater than 10.
Brave does better, leaking just over 8 bits of entropy
and having over 70% of fingerprints in anonymity sets
of size greater than 10. Tor BB performs best since
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Table 4: Trackability metrics for AFPETs.
PET ent prop_less1 prop_less10
Chrome PETs
no mask 13.002 0.892 0.983
base mask, Privacy Extension, Trace 12.914 0.829 0.982
Canvas DefenderC, cfb, Glove 12.306 0.641 0.893
HideMyFootprint 11.77 0.497 0.825
Brave 8.108 0.072 0.262
Firefox PETs
no mask 12.359 0.875 0.96
base mask, No Enum. Extensions 12.177 0.797 0.949
Blend In, TotalSpoof 12.049 0.747 0.936
CanvasBlocker 12.002 0.7 0.941
Blender 11.875 0.678 0.924
Stop Fingerprinting 11.778 0.726 0.919
Canvas DefenderF 11.263 0.483 0.833
Tor BB 4.766 0.01 0.038
it modifies all the 12 attributes we consider.
5.6 Remaining Limitations
While this hybrid method enables us to perform a
fine-grained evaluation of AFPETs with few users, it
inherits some of the limitations of the methods on
which it builds. For example, from a purely obser-
vational methods comes the limitations that samples
can be biased and that no one metric can completely
capture the quality of an AFPET. From the experi-
mental method of Section 4, we inherit the approxi-
mate nature of the mask model, which does not ac-
count for how attributes are masked and how that
affects privacy.
In particular, our analysis overestimates the effec-
tiveness of all AFPETs, since we assume any modi-
fications of an attribute by an AFPET renders that
attribute useless to a tracker. This may not be the
case. For example, Brave spoofs the User-Agent and
the Accept-Language headers to different values than
Chrome. While these spoofed values may continue to
reveal bits of entropy, we consider the attributes to
be rendered useless for tracking. Similarly, Tor BB
also reveals spoofed values of screen resolution.
We can carry out a tighter evaluation by consider-
ing a tracker which can take advantage of the spoofed
values. This evaluation requires knowledge of how an
AFPET spoofs the attribute. For Tor BB, we per-
formed a manual code analysis to determine how ex-
actly Tor BB deals with screen resolution attributes.
We rerun the hybrid analysis on a hand crafted mask
model capturing this behavior instead of using the
rough model produced by PETInspector.7 This pro-
vides a tighter evaluation for Tor BB that will serve
as the basis for our analysis in Section 7.
Finally, the above evaluations are performed on the
same set of fingerprints and applies the mask to every
fingerprint in the dataset, simulating total adoption
of the AFPET. This approach is appropriate evalu-
ations with a long-term prospective, such as select-
ing an AFPET to fund, since a properly promoted
AFPET could become nearly universal in the future.
However, those looking to select a AFPET for us-
age today should be concerned with the number of
users each AFPET has since it will affect the size
of the anonymity set the AFPET produces. In the
next section, we consider a modification of the above
method for dealing with this issue.
7 We create the handcrafted mask model of Tor BB from
the Firefox patch at https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
browser.git/commit/?h=tor-browser-45.8.0esr-6.5-
2&id=7b3e68bd7172d4f3feac11e74c65b06729a502b2.
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6 Adjusting for the Number of
Users
To observe the consequences of having user bases of
different sizes, we also evaluate the AFPETs taking
into account their popularity. Ideally, we would do
this by having the fingerprints all the users of a AF-
PET. However, not having access to this set of fin-
gerprints, we instead simulate them by drawing ran-
dom samples of fingerprints from the amiunique.org
dataset of size equal to the number of AFPET users
and estimate uniqueness metrics on the samples.
Table 5 displays the number of users of each AF-
PET in our list as of Dec. 2017. The popularity of
extensions were obtained from the Firefox add-on li-
brary [45] and the Chrome extensions webstore [27].
Tor’s popularity was obtained from the Tor Metrics
webpage [62]. For AFPETs with an undisclosed num-
ber of users, such as Braveand Tracking Protection,
we are unable to perform this evaluation.
We also do not perform these evaluations for AF-
PETs with a user base greater than 17,109 (like Tor
BB, Canvas DefenderC and CanvasBlocker), since we
cannot draw a sample from our dataset of sufficient
size. Attempting to draw such a sample by allowing
the same fingerprint to be sampled multiple times will
overestimate the effectiveness of the PET since such
repeats will surely be in the same anonymity set even
for PETs that do nothing.
For all other AFPETs, we compute the mean and
the standard error of mean (mean± sem) of the track-
ability metrics from 100 random samples. Table 6
displays the entropy-based effectiveness metrics for
these AFPETs, sorted according to the effectiveness.
We can see that CanvasFingerprintBlock scores bet-
ter than HideMyFootprint due to its high popularity,
contrary to the original evaluations in Table 4. We
also see that the effectiveness of tools with identi-
cal effects increases with popularity. For example,
TotalSpoof and Blend In both identically modify 12
attributes, but Blend In is more effective than To-
talSpoof due to its popularity. Table 6 also provides
estimates of the other trackability metrics for these
AFPETs.
7 Application:
Informing AFPET Design
With the ability to accept handcrafted mask models,
our hybrid method can help AFPET developers make
Table 5: Popularity of PETs in our list as of Dec. 2017
PET # users
Chrome
Adblock PlusC 10,000,000+
Brave NA
Canvas DefenderC 19,769
CanvasFingerprintBlock 7,630
Glove 342
HideMyFootprint 177
GhosteryC 2,788,951
Privacy Extension 915
uBlock OriginC 10,000,000+
Firefox
Adblock PlusF 13,760,128
Blend In 858
Blender 1,816
Canvas DefenderF 5,274
CanvasBlocker 27,170
GhosteryF 1,064,473
Stop Fingerprinting 1,754
Tor BB ≈4,000,000
TotalSpoof 265
Tracking Protection NA
uBlock OriginF 4,837,884
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Table 6: Uniqueness metrics for different AFPETs on samples scaled according to their popularity
PET #users ent prop_less1 prop_less10
Chrome PETs
HideMyFootprint 177.0 7.343 0.901 1.000
Glove 342.0 8.277 0.886 1.000
CanvasFingerprintBlock 7630.0 11.559 0.313 0.899
Firefox PETs
TotalSpoof 265.0 7.904 0.889 1.000
Blend In 858.0 9.401 0.777 0.983
Stop Fingerprinting 1754.0 9.994 0.641 0.939
Blender 1816.0 10.200 0.614 0.960
Canvas DefenderF 5274.0 10.656 0.252 0.845
an informed choice while designing AFPETs. By
measuring the effectiveness of hypothetical designs,
AFPET developers can compare different masking
strategies to tradeoff utility with trackability. We
carry out such an exploration comparing alternate
designs of Tor BB by applying our hybrid method on
hypothetical Tor BB versions that mask attributes
differently.
Tor BB leaks some information about the screen
resolution by only partially standardizing it. Specif-
ically, it resizes new browser windows in quanta
(step/bucket sizes) of 200×100 pixels, while capping
the window size at 1000×1000 pixels, and uses the
client content window size as screen dimensions [51].
As a result all Tor BB users get placed into one of
50 anonymity sets based on the revealed screen di-
mensions, as long as they do not change the window
dimensions manually. We explore the impact of the
choices of cap and quanta parameters on the effec-
tiveness of Tor BB.
We use the number of unutilized screen pixels due
to a spoofing strategy as a measure of utility loss.
We measure two variants: the total number of unuti-
lized pixels (average absolute loss), as well as the
number of unutilized pixels as a percentage of the
available pixels (average percentage loss). Increasing
the cap parameters and decreasing the quanta pa-
rameters reduces this loss. We first measure the ef-
fectiveness of alternate strategies with strictly lower
utility loss (i.e., higher cap and lower quanta param-
eters) than Tor BB’s. An exhaustive search of all
19,999 quanta parameters less than Tor BB’s (i.e.,
200×100), while fixing the cap parameters at Tor
BB’s (i.e., 1000×1000), finds no strategy achieving
higher effectiveness in all metrics than Tor BB. Simi-
larly, fixing the quanta parameters at 200×100, while
increasing the cap parameters in steps of 50 pixels
from 1000×1000 to 2000×2000 does not uncover any
strategy with higher effectiveness either. We perform
these explorations on the Firefox fingerprints in the
amiunique.org dataset.
Next, we explore strategies that trade-off losses re-
sulting from one set of parameters (e.g., quanta) with
gains from another (e.g., cap) with the goal of finding
a strategy that reduces the utility loss while increas-
ing the effectiveness. We find that cap width pa-
rameter to be the most in need of improvement since
less than 13% of amiunique.org fingerprints have a
screen width less than 1000 pixels. We consider al-
ternative cap widths of 1350, 1550, and 1600 since
a higher percentage of fingerprints (25%, 47%, and
51% respectively) have screen widths less than these
caps. We retain the cap height of 1000 pixels as more
than 50% of the fingerprints remain below that cap.
We exhaustively search for all 10,201 quanta in the
range 200×100 to 300×200 for all three cap parame-
ters. We set an upper bound of 300×200 as the loss
may be too high for low-resolution displays for very
high quanta parameters. We find 786 and 291 quanta
parameters for cap widths of 1350 and 1550 respec-
tively for which the losses are lower than Tor BB’s,
but the effectiveness is higher. We display strategies
with the least quanta parameters in Table 7. As we
increase the cap width to 1600, none of the quanta
parameters lead to a higher measure of effectiveness
than Tor BB.
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Table 7: Comparison of effectiveness and loss of Tor BB’s original spoofing strategies with alternate strategies.
Cap Quanta ent prop_less1 prop_less10 Abs. Loss % Loss
1000×1000 200×100 2.902 0.001 0.010 870k 50.3%
1350×1000 200×193 2.715 0.001 0.009 729k 42.6%
1350×1000 269×160 2.901 0.000 0.009 728k 42.3%
1550×1000 222×197 2.899 0.000 0.009 666k 40.3%
1550×1000 295×160 2.882 0.000 0.010 636k 37.2%
8 Conclusion and Discussion
We carry out an evaluation of 15 different AFPETs
against fingerprinting using two different methods.
We develop PETInspector and use it for experiments
to determine how these PETs spoof 18–20 different
attributes. In addition to uncovering inconsistencies,
it provides a model of AFPETs’ behaviors. While the
experimental method provides an evaluation in terms
of the number of attributes that an AFPET masks,
it cannot distinguish between the relative importance
of masking different attributes. Our hybrid method
leverages a real-world fingerprinting dataset to pro-
vide a finer grained view into the impact of modifying
different attributes. We find Tor BB to be the most
effective AFPET among the ones we evaluate using
both methods. It standardizes the most attributes
and reduces the trackability of revealed fingerprints
by the highest margins among the AFPETs we eval-
uate. We also apply our hybrid method to find some
hypothetical spoofing strategies which have a smaller
utility loss than Tor, yet are just as effective.
The Tor Project is part of the team behind the
FPCentral fingerprinting repository, which spans a
comprehensive collection of fingerprinting techniques.
This awareness helps Tor BB developers build com-
prehensive defenses against fingerprinting. This how-
ever does not mean that Tor BB users are protected
against all possible fingerprinting attacks. Developers
must be on the lookout for new fingerprinting tech-
niques and build in fresh defenses. While our tools
cannot automatically invent new attributes, it can
be extended to test them, allowing an assessment for
how to deal with them.
We end with some suggestions for AFPET develop-
ers and evaluators. We recommend that developers
address any attribute that PETInspector flags as un-
masked. The entropy results from our hybrid method
can aid in determining the order in which to address
various unmasked attributes. Given our experimental
results, we expect this task will keep the developers
of most AFPETs busy. Next, they might want to
consider any attributes that PETInspector labeled as
inconclusive. After addressing these attributes, they
can consider improving how an AFPET spoofs an at-
tribute. As shown in Section 7, not all spoofing is
equal. Developers should consider using Tor BB as
a starting point for their development and carefully
consider the default settings of their AFPET.
The set of fingerprintable attributes are open ended
and will never be fully enumerated, but new at-
tributes can be added to our tools. AFPET evalua-
tors should keep in mind that any one-time evaluation
of PETs will quickly become out of date. We encour-
age developers and advocates (e.g., the EFF) to use
automated tools to regularly test the trackability of
PETs. Our tool can fill this need.
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A Statistical Analaysis
The statistical analysis used in this last step of the
analysis engine to determine the likelihood of finding
masking depends upon the number of different values
for the attribute found across the base browsing plat-
forms. As this number increases, higher-confidence
(lower-valued) thresholds α can be achieved. Thus,
inconclusive results can be avoided by using a rich
set of platforms. However, this is not required for
avoiding false claims of not doing impactful masking,
which is controlled by α alone (with f quantifying
impactful).
In more detail, we use the geometric distribution
with f as the success probability. If this probabil-
ity is less than α, then æ reports that the attribute
is probably not f -impactfully partially standardized.
We use 0.1 for α and 0.75 for f , but these are ad-
justable.
This approach is an estimation in two senses. First,
for attributes with a finite number of values, the hy-
pergeometric distribution would give a more accurate
probability of seeing at least one standardized value,
but would require knowing the number of possible
values. The geometric distribution underestimates
this probability, making æ conservative in ruling out
standardization, that is, this estimation does not in-
crease the rate of false claims of not doing impactful
masking.
Second, using these distributions assume that the
test attributes are drawn uniformly at random. We
instead craft them to be extreme values in hopes of
triggering standardization away from outlying values.
While this makes computing the exact probability of
finding standardization impossible, it should improve
the odds of doing so except for pathologically behav-
ing PETs.
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